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An employee on the way back to his office glances at the
illuminated screen of a nearby computer. He sees the small trash
can in the lower right corner; graphics of labeled folders, docu-
ments, and applications in the center; and a strip of words across
the top of the screen. He immediately assumes that the computer
is an Apple Macintosh. A spreadsheet programmer determines
that an application program requires her to use a backslash to
access multi-layered command menus and to strike the first
letter of layered menu items in sequence in order to execute any
series of commands. She knows the software must be Lotus 1-2-3.
Apple and Lotus realize that computer users rely on these
elements to identify computer programs.' Accordingly, both
companies have invested time and money to build consumer rec-
ognition of their programs and have sought legal protection for
their user interfaces.2
A personal computer's user interface is "the means by which
the software and user interact."' Audio-visual displays are the
most obvious means of communicating with the user, but the
user interface also includes other elements of the computer
system such as the keyboard and printer.4 The "look and feel" of
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1 See Rhonda L. Rudnick, Window Dressing: Trademark Protection for Computer
Screen Displays and Software, 80 Trademark Rptr 382, 382-83 (1990).
2 See, for example, Apple Computer, Inc. v Microsoft Corp., 799 F Supp 1006 (N D
Cal 1992); Lotus Development Corp. v Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F Supp 203 (D Mass 1992)
("Lotus II"); Lotus Development Corp. v Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F Supp 37 (D Mass
1990) ("Lotus I"). Apple's and Lotus's efforts to obtain copyright protection for their user
interfaces are discussed in the text accompanying notes 30-35.
' Gregory J. Wrenn, Federal Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software
Audiovisual Look and Feel: The Lanham, Copyright, and Patent Acts, 4 High Tech L J
279, 282 (1989).
' See id at 282-83. Normally, one issues commands to the program or enters infor-
mation through a keyboard or a "mouse" pointing device. An executed command usually
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a user interface is "the sequence of the screens and the choices
presented, the layout of the screens, and the method of feedback
to the user.... ." It consists of more than just the individual
elements of the user interface; in the words of one commentator,
"Ijiust listing the elements.., doesn't do it justice ... it's the
way they all work together-the gestalt."'
The "look and feel" of software is extremely important to the
developer and may even be of greater commercial value than the
programming code that implements it.' Any product that is the
first to incorporate an intuitive user interface possesses a tre-
mendous competitive advantage.8 Thus, the development of the
user interface "has become a critical and increasingly expensive
aspect of new software development."9
Frequently, consumers identify computer products by the
product's screen display design, that is, the way a product ap-
pears to and interacts with the user once the product is up and
running." Operating-system software (generally manufactured
or licensed by the hardware vendor) and application programs in-
teract to determine screen appearance." Both system and appli-
cation software developers may use screen appearance as a
selling point, and both have an interest in the uniform and con-
sistent use of their graphics features.'2
produces visual feedback to the user on the computer's display, or perhaps a document
from the printer. Id.
' Id at 283, citing Broderbund Software, Inc. v Unison World, Inc., 648 F Supp 1127,
1137 (N D Cal 1986).
' Wrenn, 4 High Tech L J at 283 n 18 (cited in note 3), quoting J. Koltnow, Who Can
Use the Macintosh Interface?, Outside Apple (Oct 1986).
" See Wrenn, 4 High Tech L J at 284, citing Richard A. Beutel, Trade Dress Protec.
tion for the "Look and Feel" of Software: A New Source of Proprietary Rights Protection for
the Software Industry?, The Computer Lawyer 1, 2 (Oct 1988).
8 See Beutel, Trade Dress Protection at 2. Beutel was the first to suggest that soft-
ware manufacturers could litigate "look and feel" cases and that trade dress law could
protect the "look and feel" of software.
9 Id.
'o See Rudnick, 80 Trademark Rptr at 382 (cited in note 1).
" See id at 383. One example of an operating system is MS-DOS, the IBM and IBM-
compatible system. WordPerfect is an example of an application program designed to run
on an IBM or IBM-compatible computer. With increased capabilities for sophisticated
graphics, operating-system software often plays a larger role than application software in
determining screen appearance and the overall "look and feel" of the user interface.
" See Daniel R. Siegal and Douglas K. Derwin, Copyright Infringement of the "Look
and Feel" of an Operating System By its Own Application Programs, The Computer
Lawyer 1, 2 (Jan 1987). Manufacturers such as Apple Computer have supplied application
programmers with libraries of standard user interface tools and have encouraged the use
of these tools in accordance with the vendor's published rules or guidelines. Id. This
interaction of hardware and software may present particular problems for a hardware
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Developers of interfaces claim that without legal protection,
the competitive advantage enjoyed by the product that first
incorporates an intuitive user interface is usually short-lived. I"
Competitors will copy successful features, such as pull-down
menus, icon-driven commands, or mouse functionality, once those
features have been widely accepted by consumers.' 4 Thus, com-
puter and software manufacturers have sought copyright protec-
tion against misappropriation of the "look and feel" of their user
interfaces. Frequently, their efforts have taken the form of law-
suits alleging that competitors have misappropriated copyrighted
material.
To date, however, these plaintiffs have had mixed success,
arguably because they have relied on copyright law rather than
trademark law. 5 Copyright law protects individual static ele-
ments, but not composite dynamic wholes. Conversely, trade
dress law, a subset of trademark law, protects composite wholes
because trade dress is the "look and feel" of a product or its
packaging. Where copyright law has failed to protect user inter-
faces, trademark law might succeed.
This Comment argues that computer and software manufac-
turers should look to trade dress law to protect the "look and
feel" of their user interfaces. Section I describes the problems
with copyright protection for user interfaces. Section II reviews
the Lanham Act's protection for trade dress and concludes that
current trade dress law can adequately protect at least some user
interfaces.
I. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR USER INTERFACES
Manufacturers face significant legal difficulties in obtaining
copyright protection for their user interfaces. These difficulties,
such as establishing authorship and originality, stem primarily
from the disjunction between the purpose of copyright law and
the unique nature of computer manufacturers' need for protec-
tion.
vendor trying to establish the elements required for a trade dress claim.
'3 See Beutel, Trade Dress Protection at 2 (cited in note 7).
1 See id.
'5 One plaintiff has attempted to invoke trademark law to obtain protection for its
user interface, but the unusual sophistication of its consumers prevented it from estab-
lishing one of the elements necessary for a trademark case. See Engineering Dynamics,
Inc. v Structural Software, Inc., 785 F Supp 576, 583-84 (E D La 1991). See also text
accompanying note 103.
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Copyright law aims to balance the interest in public access to
information against the interest in creating sufficient incentives
to innovate; 6 it neither seeks to protect product features, such
as the user interface, that identify a product's source, nor ad-
dresses the effects of misappropriation on consumers. But user-
interface manufacturers do not need copyright protection to pro-
vide an incentive to innovate. The market for computer products
already provides sufficient incentive to create because an early
entrant captures a large market share. Instead, user-interface
manufacturers seek intellectual property protection to preserve
the capacity of their user interfaces to identify their source to
potential consumers. Even though manufacturers characterize
their efforts as protecting incentives for development, their law-
suits appear more likely motivated by a desire to preserve their
product's ability to identify its manufacturer. Because of this
disjunction between the goals of copyright law and the needs of
the manufacturers, courts have been reluctant to extend full
copyright protection to user interfaces.
The Copyright Act protects computer programs as works of
authorship. 7 Under the Act, works of authorship are protected
as soon as they are fixed in a "tangible medium of expression."' 8
Copyright law protects the software code, the overall system
logic, and the screen designs themselves. The screen display
presumably falls within the protection granted to the underlying
computer program because the screen display is not a separate
work of authorship. 9 Although copyright law affords some protec-
tion for computer software programs, the scope of the protection
"6 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325, 326 (1989).
17 17 USC §§ 102, 117 (1988).
18 17 USc § 102. Technically, registration with the United States Copyright Office is
optional; however, registration facilitates the enforcement of copyrights. 17 USC §§ 410-12
(1988). Registration is a formality that requires the author to deposit the work (unless the
work is exempt), pay a fee, and submit an application for copyright registration. 17 USC §
409 (1988). Registration entitles the copyright holder to a presumption of validity, statuto-
ry damages, and attorney's fees. 17 USC §§ 408-12 (1988). In addition, although unreg-
istered works are protected under copyright law and infringement that occurs before a
work is registered is actionable under copyright law, an author usually must register a
work before she can file an infringement suit. 17 USC § 411.
19 No separate registration is required. In fact, the Copyright Office rejected separate
audio-visual registration of screen displays in a 1988 decision. It held that the registration
of software programs was broad enough to protect the displays generated by the software.
This holding is consistent with the Office's basic policy of one registration per work, even
for works combining several authors' work in a single unit. See Copyright Office, Registra.
tion Decision; Registration and Deposit of Computer Screen Displays, 53 Fed Reg 21817,
21818-19 (1988).
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is unclear. The Copyright Office has stated that the "the courts
determine the precise scope of protection."' A software manu-
facturer will obtain copyright protection only if it demonstrates
both that the display screen is an original work and that it is the
author of that work.
These requirements present several difficulties in the com-
puter-program context. First, many programs build on existing
processes and structures, and these programs may be unable to
satisfy the originality requirement for copyright protection. For
example, one court may have denied copyright protection for the
Macintosh user interface at least in part because Apple had re-
lied heavily on development work by Xerox."' Second, a software
manufacturer may be unable to prove that it is the "author" of a
given screen display. Typically, the operating system and the
application program interact to generate a screen display. Thus,
neither the manufacturer of the operating system nor the manu-
facturer of the application program can claim authorship.'
Third, because a screen image is repainted several times per
second, it may be too transitory to pass the basic copyright stan-
dard of fixation in a tangible medium of expressionY
Still, a few copyright cases have protected the "look and feel"
of some products. In Sid & Marty Krofft Television Production,
Inc. v McDonald's Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that the
defendant's McDonald-land television characters infringed the
"total concept and feel" of Krofft's H.R. Pufnstuf characters.'
Both sets of characters were life-sized, large-headed, puppet-like,
brightly-colored, upright creatures with funny voices and silly
names. The McDonald-land characters were not exactly the same
as the Pufnstuf characters: they sported different head shapes,
different colors, different funny voices, and different silly names.
Even though the individual elements of the characters were not
identical, the court found that the defendant had infringed the
plaintiff's "look and feel" because of the overall similarity of the
concepts.'
20 Id at 21819.
21 See Apple Computer, 799 F Supp at 1017-18.
See Rudnick, 80 Trademark Rptr at 394 (cited in note 1). See also Whelan Associ-
ates, Inc. v Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F2d 1222, 1229-31 (3d Cir 1986).
2 See Stern Electronics, Inc. v Kaufman, 669 F2d 852, 855-57 (2d Cir 1982). Although
the Kaufman court acknowledged a threshold question of transiency, it held that the en-
tire effect of sight and sound created by a computer program was stable enough to be pro-
tected as an audiovisual display. Id at 857.
24 562 F2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir 1977).
25 Id at 1166-67.
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Although courts have extended copyright protection to the
"look and feel" of some products, they have not consistently pro-
tected computer user interfaces. Most courts have refused to look
beyond the individual elements of an interface to its "look and
feel."26 Instead, they have frequently denied copyright protection
because individual elements of an interface were either utilitari-
an (and thus necessary to the expression of the underlying idea)
or unoriginal.27 When an element is necessary to express an
idea, it is utilitarian and unprotectable because copyright law
protects expression but not ideasY At least in user-interface
cases, courts have generally not looked beyond individual ele-
ments to consider whether the whole expression, which may
include many elements, is necessary to express an idea.'
Three recent cases illustrate the difficulty of applying copy-
right law to the "look and feel" of computer user interfaces. In
Apple Computer, Inc. v Microsoft Corp., Apple alleged that
Hewlett-Packard's NewWave program and versions of Microsoft's
Windows program infringed its copyright in the Macintosh user
interface. 0 Apple argued that its copyright protected the "look
and feel" of its user interface-the particular combination of
graphic icons and overlapping windows. Apple asked the court to
protect the Macintosh audio-visual display as a whole because of
its "elegant interface."3' The court analyzed the elements of the
Macintosh interface separately, however, and concluded that
virtually all of those elements were individually unprotectable."
In Lotus Development Corp. v Paperback Software Int'l ("Lo-
tus I"), however, Judge Keeton protected a computer program's
' See, for example, Apple Computer, 799 F Supp at 1023-24 (denying protection
because the elements of the user interface, considered individually, were unoriginal or
functional). But see Lotus I, 740 F Supp at 67 (holding that the combination of the indi-
vidual elements was protectable); Lotus II, 799 F Supp at 217-19 (same); Broderbund
Software, 648 F Supp at 1137 (same).
17 See, for example, Apple Computer, 799 F Supp at 1023-24.
', See Melville B. Nimmer and David Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.18[B] at 2-
199 (Matthew Bender, 1993).
' The problem of when to focus on individual elements, as opposed to whole systems,
has caused much confusion in the courts in cases involving the copyright of the computer
program itself. See generally Comment, Learned Hand Never Played Nintendo: A Better
Way to Think about the Non-Literal, Non-Visual Software Copyright Cases, 61 U Chi L
Rev 613 (1994). Forcing the look and feel of a user interface into the copyright matrix
complicates matters even more, and highlights the attractiveness of an alternate approach
under trademark law.
'o 799 F Supp at 1015.
31 Id at 1016.
2 Id at 1026-46.
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"look and feel," ostensibly under copyright law.' Lotus claimed
that its copyright protected its well-known Lotus 1-2-3 spread-
sheet program and that the command structure of Paperback's
VP-Planner spreadsheet program infringed that copyright. Judge
Keeton held for Lotus, explaining that "[i]f particular characteris-
tics not distinctive individually have been brought together in a
way that makes the 'whole' a distinctive expression of an
idea.., then the 'whole' may be copyrightable."' Judge Keeton
applied the same logic in Lotus Development Corp. v Borland
Int'l, Inc. ("Lotus H"), holding that Borland had violated Lotus's
copyright by copying "the menu commands and menu command
hierarchy as well as the keystroke sequences and macro lan-
guage... of the 1-2-3 interface .... "'
Apple and Lotus couched their claims in the language of
copyright law, and all three cases were decided on copyright
grounds. Yet Judge Keeton's opinions in Lotus I and Lotus II
used the language of trademark law, relied on a trademark ratio-
nale, and extended the scope of copyright protection beyond that
typically afforded to "look and feel." The Lotus opinions might
have more accurately reflected the law had Lotus sought trade
dress protection under the Lanham Act. In addition, Apple might
have been more successful if it had sought trademark protection.
II. TRADE DRESS PROTECTION FOR THE USER INTERFACE
Both the academic literature and litigants' briefs have fo-
cused on copyright as a way to protect a developer's intellectual
property rights in a software product's "look and feel." Trade-
mark law, however, would be a better source of protection. Trade-
mark law recognizes consumers' interests in identifying a
product's source, and trade dress law, a subset of trademark law,
protects a product's overall appearance to the purchasing public.
While trade dress infringement claims have become more com-
mon in all product areas over the past few years, 8 only a few
attorneys have aggressively sought trade dress protection for the
"look and feel" of user interfaces. Most plaintiffs in these cases
simply do not pursue trademark protection at all.
740 F Supp 37, 42 (D Mass 1990).
Id at 67.
799 F Supp 203, 209 (D Mass 1992).
See Nancy Dwyer Chapman, Trade Dress Protection, in Advanced Seminar on
Trademark Law 7, 35 (PLI, 1993).
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A. Trademark Policy
Like copyright law, trademark law seeks to balance incen-
tives to create and access to ideas: it weighs the need to protect
manufacturers' incentives to invest in product identity, reputa-
tion, and customer good will against potential competitors' inter-
ests in obtaining free access to the consumer market. 7 Unlike
copyright law, however, trademark law is driven by a third con-
cern: preventing confusion in the consumer market as to the
source of a given product."
The Lanham Act codifies the federal law of trademarks in
the United States. Section 43(a) has been construed to bring
"look and feel" within the scope of the Lanham Act. That section
prohibits the false designation of a product's origin or the false
description of a product's contents. It provides that anyone who
uses any identifying features or false or misleading designation
of origin in commerce that "is likely to cause confusion ... as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services,
or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a
civil action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to
be damaged by such act." 9
Courts have used § 43(a) to protect the "look and feel" of a
product as that product's "trade dress." Trade dress has been
defined as the "packaging, size, shape, color, design, or name
which has been affixed to goods or services." 0 It is the overall
image of the product displayed to the public. Trade dress mis-
appropriation-copying a competing product's trade dress to
capitalize on that product's reputation-constitutes a false desig-
nation of origin for purposes of the Lanham Act.41
Trade dress law protects both the manufacturer's and the
market's interest in making it easy for potential consumers to
identify a product through its trade dress. 42 Accordingly, a
manufacturer's program will be able to obtain trade dress pro-
tection for an interface's "look and feel" if it can establish: (1)
See Rudnick, 80 Trademark Rptr at 396-97 (cited in note 1).
See Int'l Order of Job's Daughters v Lindeburg & Co., 633 F2d 912, 917 (9th Cir
1980) (noting that trademark law facilitates the identification of a product's manufacturer
or sponsor).
15 USC § 1125(a) (1988).
40 Beutel, Trade Dress Protection at 3 (cited in note 7).
41 See, for example, Chevron Chemical Co. v Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659
F2d 695, 703 (5th Cir 1981).
42 See J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §
2.01(2) at 2-3 (Callaghan, 3d ed 1992).
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"that the design is inherently distinctive or has acquired second-
ary meaning," thus identifying the source of the good; (2) "that
the design sought to be protected, viewed as a whole, is
'nonfunctional"'; and (3) "that similarities between plaintiff's and
defendant's designs create a likelihood of confusion as to the
source or origin of their products."43
For computer products, the user interface can function as
trade dress. A user interface may combine words, symbols, and
devices in patterns that help consumers identify its source. With-
out legal protection, competitors will copy a distinctive interface
in order to capitalize on that product's good reputation. Consum-
ers would then be unable to rely on the user interface to identify
the source of a product, either when attempting to repurchase
that product or when viewing that product outside the point of
sale.
B. Elements of a Trade Dress Infringement Case
As the following discussion will make clear, a manufacturer
should have little trouble establishing that a given user interface
is distinctive and nonfunctional, so long as the manufacturer
brings suit before the interface becomes an industry standard.
Rather, trade dress claims should turn on the "likelihood of con-
fusion" inquiry. The likelihood of point-of-sale consumer confu-
sion seems low because computers and software are typically sold
in clearly marked packages. It is thus unlikely (though conceiv-
able) that a purchaser intending to buy Lotus 1-2-3 would end up
buying, say, VP-Planner instead. But system and software manu-
facturers could still establish the requisite likelihood of confusion
because trade dress law protects against consumer confusion
beyond the point of sale; it is quite likely that an office worker
using VP-Planner would assume, incorrectly, that he was work-
ing with Lotus 1-2-3.
1. Distinctiveness.
The first requirement for trademark protection of any prod-
uct feature or set of features is "distinctiveness"--the feature
must be able to indicate the source of the product. When a set of
" Ken Liebman, Gary Frischling, and Andr6 Brunel, The Shape of Things to Come:
Trademark Protection for Computers, The Computer Lawyer 1, 2 (Dec 1992). See also
First Brands Corp. v Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir 1987); CIBA-Geigy
Corp. v Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 747 F2d 844, 854 (3d Cir 1984).
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features identifies the source of a product, it functions as a trade-
mark." A set of features satisfies this requirement either be-
cause it is inherently distinctive or because it has "secondary
meaning." Inherently distinctive trademarks are unusual or
unique and, therefore, create a distinct visual impression.45 A
showing of inherent distinctiveness ends the distinctiveness in-
quiry. Frequently, a trademark is not unusual enough to qualify
as inherently distinctive. The manufacturer must then prove that
the feature has acquired secondary meaning, or, in other words,
that the consuming public has come to view the mark as an indi-
cation of source.
a) Inherent distinctiveness. A recent Supreme Court de-
cision, Two Pesos, Inc. v Taco Cabana, Inc., established that
trade dress can be inherently distinctive and that secondary
meaning need not be shown for inherently distinctive trade
dress.' Taco Cabana, a chain of Mexican restaurants, argued
that its decor, taken as a whole, functioned as trade dress. Taco
Cabana's decor involved Mexican artifacts, bright awnings and
umbrellas, and murals. Taco Cabana charged that Two Pesos, a
competing restaurant chain, had copied its trade dress by adopt-
ing a very similar motif. Each restaurant boasted interior and
exterior patio areas, as well as a stepped exterior painted in a
festive and vivid color scheme using top border paint and neon
stripes.47
The Supreme Court observed that inherently distinctive
trademarks need not have secondary meaning to be protected
and found no reason to apply a different requirement to trade
dress cases." Moreover, the Court noted that adding a second-
ary meaning requirement in trade dress cases could have
significant anticompetitive effects and create particular burdens
for start-up businesses.49
It is not clear whether the Court meant its Two Pesos hold-
ing to apply to both inherently distinctive packaging and inher-
ently distinctive product design. ° Courts should reject any dis-
" See AmBrit, Inc. v Kraft, Inc., 805 F2d 974, 979 (11th Cir 1986).
See, for example, id at 979-80 (describing an ice cream bar wrapper as creating a
distinct visual impression).
4 112 S Ct 2753 (1992).
4 See Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir 1991).
48 112 S Ct at 2758.
'9 Id at 2761.
' See Excerpts from the U.S. Trademarks Association's Amicus Brief in Two Pesos v.
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tinction between the two and apply the rationale of Two Pesos to
both packaging and product design. Neither inherently distinc-
tive packaging nor inherently distinctive product design should
face an independent secondary meaning requirement. To date,
courts have not drawn a line between the two, probably because
it is often difficult to distinguish the product from the packaging.
Admittedly, packaging is more often inherently distinctive
than product design simply because vendors display most pro-
ducts in their packaging. This creates a greater incentive to de-
velop distinctive packaging; consumers identify these products
solely by their unique packaging. For example, a chewing gum
wrapper bearing a logo, a recognizable color scheme, and a par-
ticular configuration could easily be inherently distinctive. Con-
versely, because most unwrapped chewing gum looks similar, a
particular brand seldom has a unique "look and feel." Such a
uniform product design cannot be inherently distinctive.
Some products, however, like restaurants and computer user
interfaces, are generally viewed unwrapped. In fact, potential
consumers cannot view a computer application's user interface
until the software is removed from its packaging, set up, and the
computer is turned on. Consumers cannot view the Lotus 1-2-3
spreadsheet, command list, and menu structure until the product
is unwrapped. Manufacturers of these kinds of products therefore
have an incentive to design products with a unique "look and
feel." It is not even clear whether restaurant decor is packaging
or product design. The "look and feel" of a restaurant is arguably
part of the product itself, rather than just packaging. Similarly,
the "look and feel" of computer user interfaces can be viewed as
either packaging, the real product being the program and its
funciton, or, more likely, product design. Because both product
design and packaging sometimes identify the source of the prod-
uct, courts should continue to reject the distinction between the
two.
Some user interfaces create an inherently distinctive visual
impression. For example, Berkeley Systems's After Dark screen
saver program features a stylized underwater scene: colorful fish,
gurgling noises, and winged toasters. That visual display is
unique and unusual enough to qualify as inherently distinctive.
In general, then, program developers that create unique visual
Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc., 82 Trademark Rptr 440 (1992); Joan L. Dillon, Two Pesos More
Interesting for What It Does Not Decide, 83 Trademark Rptr 77 (1993).
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displays should be able to meet trademark law's distinctiveness
requirement without showing secondary meaning.
b) Secondary meaning. Even if a product's design is not
inherently distinctive, its manufacturer can satisfy the distinc-
tiveness requirement by proving secondary meaning. A product's
trademark or trade dress has secondary meaning when, due to
exposure to the mark, the relevant consuming public comes to
view the mark as an indication of the source of the product.51
Evidence of significant advertising,52 high sales,53 and surveys
showing that consumers do in fact associate the product feature
with a particular source,' help prove secondary meaning. In
addition, the Lanham Act provides that proof of substantially
exclusive and continuous use of a mark in commerce for five
years can be prima facie evidence that the mark has attained
secondary meaning.5
Most developers of successful user interfaces can establish
secondary meaning. Marketing practices in the computer indus-
try indicate that the interfaces are used for product and source
identification. Advertisements for, application programs often
prominently feature photographs of computer screens running
the program. For instance, advertisements for Microsoft Windows
applications show display screens with pull-down menus and
graphic representations of the user's function options.5" Indeed,
one commentator notes that "the most prominent identifying
feature of the operating system is the appearance of the user
interface features upon the display screen, including its windows,
menus, graphic designs, print sizes and styles."57 Manufacturers
of computer products can use evidence of advertising expendi-
tures and widespread sales to establish that their user interfaces
have acquired secondary meaning. Indeed, advertisements make
consumers' association of user interface with its source an inte-
gral marketing goal.58 For instance, survey data would probably
" See McCarthy, 1 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 15.02(1) at 15-18 (cited in
note 42).
52 See, for example, First Brands Corp., 809 F2d at 1383.
" See, for example, Clamp Manufacturing Co. v Enco Manufacturing Co., 870 F2d
512, 517 (9th Cir 1989).
' See, for example, Ford Motor Co. v Summit Motor Products, Inc., 930 F2d 277, 292
(3d Cir 1991).
15 USC § 1052(f) (1988).
For an example of such an ad, see Time 18-19 (Mar 28, 1994).
s' Rudnick, 80 Trademark Rptr at 399 (cited in note 1).
See Richard Brunelli and Mary Huhm, Computer Comeback, MediaWeek 16 (May
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reveal that, when shown a graphic of a desktop with icons, a
mouse, and a trash can in the lower right corner, consumers
associate that "look and feel" with the Apple Macintosh. Similar-
ly, surveyed spreadsheet users would probably identify a spread-
sheet program that requires striking the backslash key to access
the layered command menus, which then appear at the top of the
screen, as Lotus 1-2-3. Because computer user interfaces often
serve as an indication of source, most manufacturers should be
able to establish secondary meaning.
c) The problem of market standardization. The trend
toward standardization of user interfaces presents a potential
obstacle to manufacturers' attempts to establish distinctiveness.
Most user interfaces are unique when introduced. But microcom-
puter markets are moving toward "standard user interfaces"
among programs in an attempt to reduce the time it takes to
learn a new application.59 This "family look" promotes sales with-
in product lines (among all programs designed to run on one type
of computer) and across product lines (between programs de-
signed for different computer systems) by increasing consumer
confidence in and familiarity with standard techniques. Stan-
dardization may make it difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff
to establish distinctiveness because "in markets with standard
user interfaces, programs are expected to look and feel the
same."
60
Whether standardization will prevent a manufacturer from
establishing the distinctiveness of a user interface depends on
context. First, if a competitor copies a user interface that is not
inherently distinctive before it has acquired secondary meaning,
the original manufacturer obviously cannot obtain trademark
protection because it cannot show that the user interface was
distinctive. Second, standardization may defeat distinctiveness
even after the user interface has acquired secondary meaning. If
a user interface becomes the standard across product lines, it
11, 1992). In 1991, computer manufacturers spent $253.6 million in advertising in the
major consumer media and over $1 billion in computer magazines. Id.
" Bonner, User Interface Wars: The Next Wave, PC Computing 74 (Nov 1988) (pre-
dicting that standardized graphics-based operating environments would rule the computer
marketplace by the early 1990s); Christin H. Nadan and James W. Morando, Standard-
ization and Interoperability Become Key Factors in Copyright Law, 10 Computer Lawyer
12 (Apr 1993).
' Wrenn, 4 High Tech L J at 284 (cited in note 3).
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loses its secondary meaning because it no longer identifies a
particular source.
For example, if Apple's Macintosh computer and the IBM-
compatible Microsoft Windows application program both em-
ployed the same standard user interface,6' consumers would no
longer know which computer they were using merely by looking
at the user interface. That particular user interface would lack
the necessary distinctiveness or secondary meaning to support a
trade dress claim. 2 To protect a user interface with secondary
meaning from becoming standardized across product lines, a
manufacturer or developer must sue quickly, before secondary
meaning has been eroded.
But standardization within a product line, such as Apple's
Macintosh, does not undermine secondary meaning (at least with
respect to operating system software). In fact, with increased
capabilities for sophisticated graphics, the operating system often
plays a larger role in determining the overall "look and feel" of
the user interface than does the application software.6 3 Manu-
facturers of application programs prefer standardization within
product lines because it allows a particular application to be
compatible with more systems." A computer manufacturer such
as Apple will not be prevented from proving distinctiveness sim-
ply because most software developers for the Macintosh have
adopted Apple's standard user interface. While the Macintosh
user interface may tell consumers little or nothing about the
source of a particular application, the "look and feel" of the
desktop itself tells them that they are viewing an Apple Comput-
er.
Similarly, a manufacturer of an application program may be
able to establish secondary meaning for its "look and feel" as long
as a standard has not developed in the relevant application mar-
ket. If the "look and feel" of a particular program becomes the
standard for a type of application, however, the manufacturer of
that program will not be able to establish secondary meaning
61 Which, by the way, they do not-at least for the time being. Apple and IBM are
collaborating on a next-generation machine that will bridge the DOS/Apple gap. See
Charles T.C. Compton, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coalition: A Perspective on the
Types and Purposes of Technology Joint Ventures, Antitrust L J 61 (Mar 1993). The trade
dress implications of this collaboration lie beyond the scope of this Comment.
62 See Liebman, Trademark Protection for Computers at 7 (cited in note 43).
See Rudnick, 80 Trademark Rptr at 386 (cited in note 1).
Id.
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because consumers will not associate the "look and feel" of the
program with that manufacturer.
For example, if Lotus had not sued quickly to protect its
Lotus 1-2-3 interface, its acceptance as an industry standard
might have precluded trade dress protection. Arguably, consum-
ers now believe that the Lotus interface represents all spread-
sheet programs for IBM and IBM-compatible personal computers.
Lotus's interface may have lost its secondary meaning because
other developers, such as Paperback Software and Borland Inter-
national, have used the Lotus interface for their products. None-
theless, frequent references in the market to the "Lotus" interface
suggest that consumers still identify Lotus Development Corpora-
tion as the souce of the interface.' The courts should continue
to protect the Lotus interface because Lotus sued while the inter-
face still had secondary meaning. Had Lotus delayed action too
long, its secondary meaning might have eroded.66
In holding for Lotus, the Lotus I court held:
If particular characteristics not distinctive individually have
been brought together in a way that makes the "whole" a
distinctive expression of an idea.., then the "whole" may be
copyrightable. 7
The idea that a "whole" can be distinctive is a trademark idea;
traditionally, it is trade dress law that protects wholes, while
copyright law protects only individual elements. In addition,
Judge Keeton's use of the word "distinctive," a key word in
trademark law, indicates that he was making a trademark in-
quiry. In essence, the Lotus I court held that Lotus's user inter-
face was distinctive.
Most computer user interfaces should be able to satisfy the
distinctiveness requirement. Occasionally, standardization will
present an obstacle, particularly if a manufacturer fails to move
quickly to protect its interface. If a manufacturer does move
quickly, however, the court should find that its user interface is
' See, for example, Erica Schroeder, Calling all Applications: Technology Brings
Voice Recognition Toward Mainstream, PC Week 41 (Nov 15, 1993).
See Wrenn, 4 High Tech L J at 287 (cited in note 3). If a manufacturer waits too
long to assert intellectual property claims, a trademark can lose its secondary meaning
and become an unprotectable generic mark. See, for example, Bayer Co. v United Drug
Co., 272 F 505, 510-11 (S D NY 1921) (holding that "aspirin" had become a generic term).
See generally Louis Altman, ed, 3 The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and
Monopolies § 18.24 at 217 (Callaghan, 4th ed 1990).
' 740 F Supp at 67.
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distinctive even when the industry has adopted the
manufacturer's interface as a standard.
2. Nonfunctionality.
Even if a manufacturer is able to establish the distinctive-
ness of its user interface, whether by showing inherent distinc-
tiveness or secondary meaning, it is not assured of securing
trademark protection. To prevail in a trademark case, the manu-
facturer must also demonstrate that the trade dress it seeks to
protect is "nonfunctional" and that other manufacturers' use of
the trade dress would create a likelihood of confusion in the con-
sumer market. A design is functional-and therefore
unprotectable-only if the benefits inherent in the particular
design cannot be duplicated effectively through the use of other
designs. Therefore, courts often look to the availability of alterna-
tive designs that afford similar advantages when deciding wheth-
er or not a design is functional.68 "In general, a functional
design [or trade dress] is one that is costly to do without."69 By
excluding functional designs from trademark protection, the
courts have attempted to identify those instances in which the
anticompetitive consequences of granting exclusive rights out-
weigh the public and private interest in protecting distinctive
designs.
When deciding whether a product package or feature is func-
tional, courts usually consider some combination of the following
factors: "[w]hether the features in question are 'essential to the
use or purpose of the article'; [w]hether the features 'affect [ I the
cost or quality of the article'; [w]hether the features achieve econ-
omies in manufacture or use; [wihether there are available alter-
natives to the features[,] and [wihether giving one party exclu-
sive rights to the features will hinder competition."" Thus,
courts deny protection to trade dress on grounds of functionality
only when protection would significantly hinder competition.
See, for example, In re Morton-Norwich Products, Inc., 671 F2d 1332, 1341 (CCPA
1982).
6 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 17, cmt b (Tentative Draft No 2,
1990) ("Restatement").
"0 Liebman, Trademark Protection for Computers at 2 (cited in note 43) (citations
omitted).
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a) Functionality of a "whole." Courts consider the design
of a product or its packaging as a whole when determining
whether or not trade dress is functional. In the leading case of
Hartford House, Ltd. v Hallmark Cards, Inc., the Tenth Circuit
noted that "the appropriate inquiry is not whether each individu-
al feature of the trade dress is functional but whether the whole
collection of features, taken together, is functional."7' Hartford
claimed that a line of Hallmark greeting cards infringed the
trade dress of its Blue Mountain Arts cards.72 Both product lines
consisted of two-fold greeting cards with similar elements: poetry
on the first and third pages, deckle edge on the first page (jagged,
sometimes charred), and soft color backgrounds done with air
brush or light watercolor strokes. The court upheld the lower
court's finding that Hartford's Blue Mountain Arts greeting cards
had an inherently distinctive and highly uniform overall appear-
ance.73 The court protected Hartford's overall design, even
though the individual elements of the design were functional.
The court noted that competitors like Hallmark could combine
these functional elements in several different ways to create
essentially the same product at the same cost.74
The Hartford House rationale extends far beyond the greet-
ing card context. Thus, a court can extend trademark protection
to any combination or arrangement of features, so long as that
combination or arrangement is not itself functional. Moreover,
"[p]rotection of the overall design [ will not preclude others from
using the individual functional [components]."75
In the computer context, even though some features of a user
interface may be functional, its overall "look and feel" is probably
not functional. For example, a particular pull-down menu may be
functional. Admittedly, products have displayed menus in many
different ways. Some display no menu at all, while others employ
function keys or combinations of standard keys on the keyboard
in lieu of menus to execute commands. Nonetheless, pull-down
menus "may be said to affect the quality of the product in terms
of ease of use, efficacy or salability."7' Therefore, if pull-down
menus provide unique benefits that cannot be duplicated by al-
ternative designs, they are functional.
7' 846 F2d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir 1988). See also Restatement § 17, cmt b (same).
72 846 F2d at 1272.
71 Id at 1273-74.
74 Id.
7' Restatement § 17 cmt b.
' Wrenn, 4 High Tech L J at 289 (cited in note 3).
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Even if the pull-down menu or another individual element is
functional, however, the combination, location, and arrangement
of the trash can, menus, icons, and other elements of the
Macintosh user interface is not, taken as a whole, functional.
Although the "look and feel" of a user interface certainly plays a
"functional" role in that it is essential to the use or purpose of
the computer, a particular design is not functional for the purpos-
es of trade dress law so long as alternative designs afford similar
advantages at comparable costs. Even if an individual element is
arguably aesthetically functional, that is, it contributes to the
aesthetic appeal of the product so much that it becomes part of
the definition of the product," no one combination of elements
confers a unique and significant benefit, unmatched by other
designs. User interfaces are so complex that different combina-
tions are almost always possible. Competitors can borrow func-
tional elements from an established user interface and combine
them to create a different overall "look and feel." Where such
alternative combinations are available, the overall "look and feel"
of most user interfaces should be deemed nonfunctional.
b) Functional standards. As discussed above, the devel-
opment of an industry standard may prevent a manufacturer
from proving distinctiveness. Similarly, standardization may
prevent a manufacturer from proving nonfunctionality. When one
manufacturer copies another's successful user interface, the man-
ufacturer who first introduced the interface must sue to protect it
before it becomes an admitted "industry standard." If a user
interface becomes the standard across product lines, consumers
probably will insist that products adhere to that standard. Then,
the user interface will not only lack the requisite distinctiveness,
but it will also become fimctional. For example, one court held
that a computer keyboard layout and arrangement of keys had
become functional.78 That court relied on U.S. Golf Association v
St. Andrews Systems, in which the Third Circuit held:
" See Restatement § 17, cmt c. Courts have largely rejected the rule that aesthetic
appeal, without more, establishes functionality. See, for example, Brunswick Corp. v
Spinit Reel Co., 832 F2d 513 (10th Cir 1987); Stormy Clime, Ltd. v Progroup, Inc., 809
F2d 971 (2d Cir 1987); American Greetings Corp. v Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F2d 1136
(3d Cir 1986); LeSportsac, Inc. v KMart Corp., 754 F2d 71 (2d Cir 1985). But see Wallace
Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F2d 76 (2d Cir 1990).
78 See Digital Equipment Corp. v C. Itoh and Co., 229 USPQ 598, 606 (D NJ 1985).
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The fact that any number of standards may be feasible and
useful does not mean that the preferred standard is not
"functional."... To allow a monopoly over such a standard
would defeat the policy of fostering competition that under-
lies the functionality doctrine. 9
For example, the Lanham Act would not have protected the
Lotus 1-2-3 interface if "it 'function[edl' as a standard that other
software creators had to copy in order to spare buyers the costs of
retraining or adapting to an unfamiliar user interface.""0 Lotus
sued quickly, however, before a functional standard had devel-
oped in the industry. Thus, the Lotus I court implicitly rejected
this standardization argument. Instead, the court held that
Lotus's user interface was nonutilitarian.8' Because utilitarian-
ism is the copyright analog to trademark's functionality require-
ment,82 Lotus I suggests that the "look and feel" of Lotus's user
interface is also nonfunctional.
3. Likelihood of confusion.
Finally, to establish trade dress infringement under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, a manufacturer must demonstrate a
likelihood of confusion between its product's identifying features
and those of the allegedly infringing product." A likelihood of
confusion exists when "an appreciable number of ordinarily pru-
dent purchasers [and potential purchasers] are likely to be mis-
led, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in
question."' Evidence suggesting that a defendant intentionally
copied a plaintiff's trade dress raises a presumption of likelihood
of confusion.85 Intentional copying is difficult to prove, however,
and in the absence of such evidence, courts will consider a wide
range of factors bearing on the likelihood of consumer confu-
sion."8
79 749 F2d 1028, 1034 (3d Cir 1984).
o Liebman, Trademark Protection for Computers at 7 (cited in note 43).
" Lotus I, 740 F Supp at 78-79.
See Note, From Fast Cars to Fast Food: Overbroad Protection of Product Trade
Dress Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 45 Stan L Rev 2037, 2065 (1993).
See First Brands Corp., 809 F2d at 1383-84 (collecting cases).
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F2d 44, 47 (2d Cir 1978). See also
Perini Corp. v Perini Construction, Inc., 915 F2d 121, 127 (4th Cir 1990); Comment,
Clearly Erroneous Review of Mixed Questions of Law and Fact: The Likelihood of Confu-
sion Determination in Trademark Law, 59 U Chi L Rev 1291, 1293 (1992).
' See, for example, Warner Bros., Inc. v American Broadcasting Co., 720 F2d 231,
246-47 (2d Cir 1983).
" These factors include the strength of the feature as a trademark, the proximity of
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In the context of suits seeking protection for user interfaces,
this third element of the trademark case will tend to be the most
difficult for a manufacturer to establish. However, because trade-
mark law is concerned not only with point-of-sale consumer con-
fusion, but also with consumer confusion at any point in time,
the likelihood-of-confusion barrier should not prove insurmount-
able.
a) Confusion at the point of sale. One must not be too
quick to dismiss the possibility of a manufacturer's proving point-
of-sale consumer confusion. A likelihood of confusion may exist
even if a customer can tell the original product and the infringing
product apart. The actions that a competitor must take to avoid
confusion depend on the circumstances; clear labeling of the
source may not be sufficient. 7 "[A] label cannot altogether pre-
clude the possibility of likelihood of confusion because consumers
may still be drawn to the infringing product in the first place";
they may mistakenly develop an initial interest in the product
"because its trade dress so closely resembles that of the other,
already familiar product.""8 For example, there may be some
confusion about the source of a computer system at the point of
sale, especially if a consumer does not notice labeling or does not
know which source is generally associated with the particular
features he needs. In Mobil Oil Corp. v Pegasus Petroleum Corp.,
the court upheld a finding of likelihood of confusion based on "the
probability that potential purchasers would be misled into an
initial interest in Pegasus Petroleum. Such initial confusion
works a sufficient trademark injury."89
A disclaimer may not be sufficient to avoid likelihood of con-
fusion either. In Reader's Digest Association, Inc. v Conservative
Digest, Inc., Reader's Digest brought a trade dress misappropria-
tion claim against Conservative Digest when the latter adopted a
the goods, evidence of actual confusion, the marketing channels used, the type of goods,
the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser, the defendant's intent in se-
lecting the mark, and the likelihood of expansion of the product lines. See First Brands,
809 F2d at 1384 n 6, citing AMF, Inc. v Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir
1979); Polaroid Corp. v Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F2d 492, 495 (2d Cir 1961).
' See Fuddruckers, Inc. v Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F2d 837, 846 n 13 (9th Cir
1987) ("Use of differing names or distinctive logos in connection with similar marks can
reduce the likelihood of confusion but doesn't always do so.").
" Schwinn Bicycle Co. v Ross Bicycles, Inc., 678 F Supp 1336, 1347 (N D Ill 1988),
vacated on other grounds, 870 F2d 1176, 1187 (7th Cir 1989).
'9 818 F2d 254, 260 (2d Cir 1987) (holding an oil company's use of the name "Pega-
sus" infringed on Mobil's use of a flying horse symbol with the word "Pegasus").
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"new look" for its cover, remarkably similar in "size, shape, and
graphic design" to the cover of Reader's Digest.' To remedy the
situation, Conservative Digest promised to mail its magazines
with a disclaimer on the wrapper stating that it was not affiliat-
ed with any other magazine. The D.C. Circuit rejected the
defendant's argument that its disclaimer would negate any likeli-
hood of confusion. The court indicated that, although this dis-
claimer might prevent one magazine from being mistaken for the
other, it would not prevent confusion as to source or sponsorship
because many readers would not see the disclaimer on the outer
wrapper."
Similarly, a disclaimer on a computer, an application pro-
gram, or the packaging for either one might not be enough to
prevent confusion as to source or sponsorship. A consumer view-
ing VP-Planner disks bearing a disclaimer--"these disks do not
contain the Lotus 1-2-3 program"-may still believe that VP-
Planner is somehow associated with Lotus, sponsored by Lotus,
or that the programs are manufactured by the same company.
More importantly, potential consumers seldom view the disks
themselves, but more often view the program while running on a
computer. Even a comprehensive disclaimer on a disk would not
prevent confusion as potential consumers view the program on-
screen. Thus, the similarity between the VP-Planner and Lotus
user interfaces would reinforce a consumer's original misconcep-
tion.
b) Beyond the point of sale. Trademark and trade dress
law protect against a likelihood of customer confusion not only at
the point of sale, but also whenever customers view the mark.92
Indeed, several cases have held that confusion need not occur at
the point of sale to be actionable, and have also held that
trademark law prevents competitors from misleading potential
customers as well as actual purchasers."
Similarity of products.., does become actionable when the
similarity leads to confusion as to source and the public
821 F2d 800, 802 (DC Cir 1987).
9' 821 F2d at 805.
' See McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23.01(4)(a) at 23-13 (cited
in note 42).
' See, for example, Esercizio v Roberts, 944 F2d 1235, 1245 (6th Cir 1991), cert de-
nied, 112 S Ct 3028 (1992); Rolex Watch U.S., Inc. v Canner, 645 F Supp 484, 492 (S D
Fla 1986).
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cares who the source of the product is . .. . "[A plaintiff]
must show that the consuming public is primarily concerned
in the producer, rather than in the product itself .... ""
Courts have found a likelihood of confusion outside the point of
sale where a competitor is attempting to derive benefit from
another manufacturer's reputation. They protect manufacturers'
investments in their reputations because manufacturers invest
vast resources in developing their reputations and consumers
then associate computers with their manufacturers. These courts
therefore protect the value and exclusivity of a seller's reputa-
tion.
These concerns arise when consumers care about whether
they are purchasing a brand name or a look-alike. In Esercizio v
Roberts, Roberts manufactured fiberglass kits that replicated the
exterior features of Ferrari's Daytona Spyder and Testarossa
automobiles. 5 Although Roberts's replicas were virtually identi-
cal in external appearance to the Ferrari automobiles, a customer
who purchased one of Roberts's kits knew he was not buying a
Ferrari. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit held that because Ferrari
consumers "care that they are purchasing a Ferrari as opposed to
a car that looks like a Ferrari,... Ferrari presented an action-
able claim as to confusion of source.""
Courts have not limited the "confusion outside the point of
sale" rationale to "prestige goods" such as Ferraris. They invoke
this rationale whenever customers care about the identity of the
producer as much as the product itself. Courts should extend the
logic of Esercizio to personal computers and application programs
because people associate these products with their manufactur-
ers. The Lanham Act protects against confusion resulting from
any goods in commerce; the Act "was intended to do more than
protect customers at the point of sale."97 In Rolex Watch U.S.A.,
Inc. v Canner, the court recognized that the broad protection
afforded to customers outside the point of sale was necessary to
protect against the cheapening of the original product and to
protect the manufacturer's reputation." Congress's intent that
the Lanham Act's protection extend beyond the point of sale is
Esercizio, 944 F2d at 1243, quoting West Point Mfg. Co. v Detroit Stamping Co.,
222 F2d 581, 589 (6th Cir 1955).
95 944 F2d 1235.
96 Id at 1244.
97 Id.
' 645 F Supp at 492-93.
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apparent from the Act's history. When enacted in 1946, the Act
permitted an infringement action only when the alleged infringer
used the mark in a manner "likely to cause confusion or mistake
or to deceive purchasers as to the source or origin of such
goods."' In amending the Act in 1962, Congress broadened the
statute to reach marks "likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive."'
Just as in Esercizio, purchasers may not be confused at the
point of sale, where computer products are clearly labeled.
Nonetheless, potential consumers, such as office workers and
students, could become confused as to source or sponsorship of a
computer product viewed outside the point of sale.1"'
In fact, a user interface may present a better case for trade-
mark protection than Esercizio. Potential customers interested in
buying a real Ferrari would not have been misled by Roberts's
replicas. The competing cars sold for markedly different prices
and were not available at the same retail outlets. Roberts could
not have used his replicas to pull business away from Ferrari.
The people who purchased Roberts's kits did so because they
wanted to purchase Ferrari look-alikes, not because they thought
they were purchasing the real thing.
In contrast, potential consumers of computer products may
see a computer's user interface on co-workers' desks or in store
windows and assume that they are viewing the Apple Macintosh
or Lotus 1-2-3 interface. By the time they eventually discover
that they were really viewing Microsoft Windows or VP-Planner,
they may already have invested time and energy in researching
and shopping for the wrong product. Microsoft Windows or VP-
Planner retailers could then convince these potential consumers
that the look-alike products are indistinguishable from the
Macintosh or Lotus 1-2-3; they will have used Apple's or Lotus's
reputation and customer recognition to lure customers into inves-
tigating and ultimately purchasing look-alike products. Trade
dress law attempts to prevent precisely this kind of misappropri-
ation of another product's good reputation.
" 60 Stat 437 (1946).
"0 Pub L No 87-772, 76 Stat 773 (1962), codified at 15 USC § 1114 (1988). See also
Esercizio, 944 F2d at 1244.
... See McCarthy, 2 Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23.01(4)(a) at 23-13 (cited
in note 42).
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c) Sophistication of consumers. Because likelihood of
confusion is a fact-based, market-specific inquiry, courts may find
that a likelihood of confusion exists with respect to one set of
consumers but not with respect to another, more sophisticated
group. Indeed, many computer systems and applications are no
longer marketed exclusively to highly sophisticated custom-
ers.'0 2 Therefore, customer sophistication should not pose an
obstacle to proving likelihood of confusion for these mass-mar-
keted products, such as the Macintosh computer and Microsoft
Windows program.
If its potential consumers are, on average, knowledgeable
and sophisticated, a manufacturer of a computer user interface
who asserts a trade dress violation still must show that the con-
sumers are likely to be confused by the defendant's user inter-
face. On the other hand, the defendant can credibly claim that
consumers are too knowledgeable to have been confused by sim-
ilar-looking software where that software only serves a special-
ized, technical market. Indeed, the one court to have considered
and denied trade dress protection for the "look and feel" of a user
interface concluded that the sophisticated target market, offshore
engineers, would probably not be confused by the similar user
interfaces. 3
Similarly, courts should consider the sophistication of the
consumer of business programs, such as Lotus and VP-Planner.
If they are purchased solely by expert technical services person-
nel, courts may be reluctant to find a likelihood of confusion.
Conversely, if owners and officers of small or medium-sized busi-
nesses are procuring computer products based on reputation, rec-
ommendations, and little technical knowledge, courts should be
more likely to find a likelihood of confusion. Not all systems or
programs have consumers so sophisticated as to preclude a likeli-
hood of confusion.
C. Scope of Protection
Once a plaintiff has won a trade dress misappropriation case
by establishing distinctiveness, nonfunctionality, and a likelihood
of confusion, the losing defendant must modify its product. There
is no quantitative threshold that dictates how many changes a
102 See Beutel, Trade Dress Protection at 4 (cited in note 7).
103 See Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v Structural Software, Inc., 785 F Supp 576, 583-
84 (E D La 1991).
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defendant must make; it must change the "look and feel" enough
to avoid a likelihood of confusion. For example, if Hallmark want-
ed to continue selling cards similar to those that had infringed
Hartford's trade dress, it would need to modify its cards so that
consumers would not confuse them with Hartford's. The court
had held that the overall "look and feel" of Hartford's greeting
cards was distinctive and nonfunctional, implying that the func-
tional elements could be combined in several different ways to
create the same product for approximately the same cost. Hall-
mark could continue to use functional elements, such as deckle
edges and watercolors, as long as the overall "look and feel" of its
cards was different enough from that of Hartford's cards to avoid
a likelihood of confusion.
A defendant found to infringe on the "look and feel" of a
plaintiff's user interface would have to modify its user interface
to avoid a likelihood of confusion. For example, if Apple had ob-
tained trade dress protection against Microsoft, Microsoft could
have continued to use functional features, such as the trash can
and pull-down menus, so long as consumers did not confuse the
overall "look and feel" of its user interface with the Macintosh in-
terface.
CONCLUSION
Courts have proven reluctant to award copyright protection
to user interface "look and feel." This is understandable and
indeed entirely proper-copyright protection is broader than
trademark protection because it is much easier to establish
copyright's requisite substantial similarity than trademark's
likelihood of confusion. Copyright protection would stifle the
development of new interface features because it would make it
more expensive to build on existing work. Moreover, copyright
protection may be unnecessary-because early entrants capture
the lion's share of the market, the market provides sufficient in-
centives to innovate.
But the "look and feel" of computer user interfaces should
still be protected, in order to prevent consumer confusion. Trade
dress law provides exactly that type of narrow protection. Trade
dress law protects the "look and feel" of a product as a whole, and
although a product's individual features may be functional, its
overall "look and feel" usually will not be. Because of the difficul-
ty in establishing all the elements of a trade dress misappropria-
tion case, trade dress claims will not always be successful. De-
spite this limitation, trade dress law represents a more promising
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source of intellectual property protection for computer user inter-
faces than does copyright law. Some manufacturers will be able
to prove distinctiveness, nonfunctionality, and likelihood of confu-
sion, and thus will prevail on a trade dress theory. In fact, Apple
Computer may very well have been able to establish the elements
and obtain protection for its Macintosh user interface on a trade
dress theory.
